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Do

THE LIBERATING FUNCTION
OF PHILOSOPHY
IN EDUCATION

Leonard M. Fleck

"But wherever ideas are effective, there is freedom." 1

The primary intent of this paper is not to advance or defend any novel philosophic
theses. Rather, the purpose is to provide what I will call a "philosophic service" for
undergraduate teachers of philosophy. More specifically, I am concerned both with the
continued decline of interest in the liberal arts (philosophy in particular) among undergraduates and with the apparent 111ability of many teachers of the liberal arts to articulate
satisfactorily a rationale for the pursuit of the liberal arts. In this paper I cannot analyze all
the complex economic and socio-cultural factors that have conspired to minimize the
importance of the liberal arts. But l can contribute to the articulation of an adequate
rationale for the continued pursuit of the liberal arts, and l can do so in a way that will
resonate with some of the dominant concerns of our contemporary undergradu.ites.
Specifically, my contention is that a rarl1cal articulation of the function of the liberal arts 15
required, radical in the sense of going to the roots of the liberal arts. There we find that the
lib era l arts are liberal precisely to the extent that they contribute to the l1l,a11tw11 ot
persons. The way in which each of the arts effects human liberation is something unique
to that art. ln this paper I shall concentrate on the way philosophy effects human
liberation. Furthermore, I wish to situate my comments in the context of the tntroducton
philosophy course, for I think that it is a mistake to believe that the liberal art, are
somehow intrinsically liberating. How the liberal arts are conveyed will determtne quite
as much as their content whether or not they are humanly liberating. 2
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I.

In inqumng of my students why they thought the liberal arts should be an integral part
of a college education, 1 found that they tended to subscribe to one or another of four
theories of the function of the liberal arts. They may be conveniently labelled as: (1) The
Gourmand Theory ("We should study the liberal arts because it's good for us to have a
taste of everything"); (2) The Cocktail Theory ("We should study the liberal arts because
we'll be able to talk with more people from different backgrounds at parties and other
such social affairs") (3) The Bangles and Baubles Theory ("We should study the liberal arts
because it's part of being cultured and we should have some culture (just as we should
have a snazzy sportcoat or a frilly dress for special occasions); and (4) The Cogito, ergo
Cog,to Theory ("We should study the liberal arts because the liberal arts help us to
think").
It should be noted that these theories are rarely presented by students with co11victio11,
as philosophers are prone to present their theories. Rather, the dominant tone ,s one of
rcs1g11nf1011 n11d ncccptn11cc. That is, they have been given reasons by their parents and
teachers for studying the liberal arts, and, upon request, they will dutifully pass along
these reasons to whoever asks the appropriate question. Clearly, however, these reasons
are not an integral part of their thought or existence. Their existential relationship to these
reasons is analogous to that of an airline information clerk to the information he dispenses.
What I would suggest is that the superficiality of this relationship is indicative of the
superficiality of the reasons themselves. That is, the reasons advanced in connection with
each of the theories mentioned above fail to make connection with the depths of an
individual's being. They fail to exhibit the liberal arts as literally vital to man's being as
man. Instead , they tend to suggest that the liberal arts are little more than cultural
costuming. Certainly from a sociological perspective it is probably true that this latter
claim more accurately represen ts present cultural attitudes than does the former. And that
is precisely where the problem lies. The fashions in cultural costuming are changing. No
longer is it necessary to include in one's mental wardrobe historical, philosophical ,
literary, and artistic suits. A few good business suits and sports outfits will do just fine.
Unfortunately, in responding to this challenge many defenders of the liberal arts have
often been their own worst enemies. For they are ultimately responsible for advancing
the superficial reasons referred to above, the reason s that have just enough truth in them to
tranquilize the critical faculties. By way of illustrati on, consider the Gourmand Theory.
The truth contained in the Goum1and Theory is that the liberal arts provide us with
comprehensiveness of experience and knowledge. One of its chief deficiencies is its
uggestion that significant comprehensiveness of experience and knowledge is attainable apart from depth and connectedness of experience ar,d knowledge. To be liberally
educated requires merely that one taste man y different courses. What is involved here is a
confusion between the well-informed man and the wise man.
Another deficiency of this theory is that it fails to offer any f1111dn111c11tnl explanation of
why comprehensiveness of experience and knowledge are valuable. 1would contend that
this explanation must be sought in the function of comprehensiveness of experience and
knowledge in the attainment of human liberation . We are born creatures of necessity physical, psychological, and cultural necessity. The process of liberating ourselves from
these necessities by achieving a comprehensive knowledge of their workings in our lives
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is an integral part of the process of our own humanization. It is precisely in this
connection between the processes of liberation and humanization that we find a fundamental , practical, existential explanation of why comprehensiveness of experience and
knowledge is valuable. This is the sort of explanation that transcends shifts in cultural
fashions and that provides an enduring ground for the liberal arts.
I urning next to the Cocktail Theory, it contains the truth that by means ot the l1beral
arts we can augment our ability to communicate effectively with others. No doubt this is a
valuable skill, especially in connection with some occupations. But herein hes the main
defect of this theory. It fails to explain in any f1mdame11/a/ way the role of communicat10n
in the constitution of human life. That is, it fails to indicate the connections that bind 111l0
an organic totality the processes of communication, liberation, and humanization. It
suggests that communication is accidental rather than essential to human existence.
As in the case of the two preceding theories, the Bangles and Baubles Theory has an
element of truth in it. Briefly, it is that the liberal arts provide one of the chief instruments
for the transmission of culture from one generation to another. The chief failing of this
theory is that it trivializes culture (as well as the liberal arts) by its suggestion that culture
is a matter of personal, inner ornamentation, something ultimately inessential for the
development of the human person . Furthermore, carried to its logical conclusion this
theory is a source of social division and dehumanization in that culture becomes a barrier
that divides economic, social, and political classes. Thus, culture, instead of bemg ' the
capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings,"3 as Dewey puts it , and instead of being a source of free and full communication
(and hence, liberation), becomes an insurmountable obstacle to communication and a
tool for effecting the submission of one social class to another.
The last of the theories to be considered is what 1 have dubbed the Cog1to, ergo Cog1t o
Theory. The truth in this theory is that one of the primary functions of the Ii beral arts 1s to
augment and refine our abilities to think. A critical deficiency of this theory is that it loses
sight of the instrumental function of thinking. It tends to make thinking mto an end in
itself, the result being a degeneration of the liberal arts into a sterile intellectualism.
Certainly this is a common view among those in our culture who are not committed by
faith alone to believe in the value of the liberal arts. But it seems to me that the liberal arts
ought to make af1111dame11tal, practical difference in the quality of our living, a difference
as demonstrable as those made by business and science. I would suggest that such a
difference may be specified in terms of the liberating function of the liberal arts in our
thought and action. This point will be elaborated upon in the next section of this paper.
Before moving on to the next section though, a response is in order to the possible
charge that I have been guilty of caricaturing otherwise reputable positions. I wi II readily
grant that more defensible versions of all the theories I have mentioned have been put
forth, and by reputable thinkers. But the views of these thinkers have not been the object
of my criticism. Rather , my object has been the popular views that circulate among
undergraduates, and even their teachers. For this is where the practical problem hes and
the point at which a suitable response must be directed. I shall now turn to the tctsl-. of
formulating that response .
II.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, the remainder of this paper will be given over to
a discussion of the liberating function specific to philosophy as one of the liberal arts.
Furthermore, the context for these remarks will be that of an introductorv philosophy
course.
The beginning of wisdom is an accurate knowledge of one's own present wndition .
Herbert Marcuse, following the lead of Hegel and Marx, has remarked :' All liberation
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depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is
always ham pered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great
extent, have become the individual 's own. " 4 If the liberal arts in general and philosophy
in particular are going to be recognized by students as having a liberating role to play in
their lives, then th ey will first have to become conscious of their own servitu de. This is by
no means an easy task, for the vast maiority of students recognize only overt forms of
political repression as servi tude . They are almost totally insensitive to non-political,
covert forms of servitude. This may be explained in part by the fact that we live in an
affluent, highly mobile (socially and physically), highly democratic society. We have so
many liberties and opportunities that it is difficult to imagine what further liberation
might consist in. It is even more difficult to believe that this further liberation could be
more fundame ntal and more necessary for living a good life than the specific liberties we
alreadv possess.' This, then , is the problem with which I, as an undergraduate teacher of
philosophy, must cope.
In my teachin)a; l approach this problem by trying to make evident to my students four
specific modes of philosophic servitude and four corresponding modes of philosophic
liberation. I usually begin by acknowledging my own philosophic commitments. Briefly,
these mar be covered by the label 'sy mbolic interact10nism.' John Dewey and George
Herbert Mead are generally taken to be the sources of this position. Roughly speaking ,
one of the defining tenets of symbolic interactionism is that the symbols we employ for
purposes of representing reality are in fact constitutive of reality. The world that we as
human beings inhabit is a socio-symbolic construct. That is, man's world is a world of
ob1ccts, things that have been invested with social meaning. Among the significant
objects in this world are selves. They are first and foremost products of social interaction.
Only much later in their development do they acquire the capacity for determining their
own being. But even then the exercise of the capacity for self-determination is severely
restricted by the particular world (1.e., an organized system of social beliefs, social values ,
and social institutions) into which a self is born.
This brings us to our first form of servitude, cultural servitude. The social world into
which we are born does not present itself to us as a world, but rather, as the world, the
11<1/11ral world , the rig/11 world, reality as it is and 11111st l,c. In this connection Whitehead
writes: " In each period there is a general form of the forms of thought; and, like the air we
breathe, such a form is so translucent , and so pervading, and so seemingly necessary , that
o nl y by extreme effort can we become aware of it."" Whitehead, of course, is referring to
the philosophy that defines an age or culture. Theodore Roszak in his book The Making of
11 Counter C11/t11re supplies us with one contemporary example of Whitehead 's point. Hi s
concern is with the subtle and perva sive wa y in which technocracy has become the ruling
fo rce in our lives. I le observes that "it 1s characteristic of the technocracy to render itself
1dcologically invisible. Its assumptions about reality and its values become as unobtru sivelv pervasive as the air we breathe. " 7
The servi tude involved in the situation described by Roszak and Whitehead is really of
a twofold sort. First, there is the servitude of having no options or severely restricted
options. To the ex tent that we are re s tricted to the perspective of our culture, we are
restricted to the options permitted by the beliefs, values , and institutions of our culture .
To the extent that a s111gle philosophy shapes that culture, our servitude is as fundamental
and as encompassing as it can possibly be. I make this point explicitly for purposes of
e mphasizing the incomparable significance of both philosophic servitude and
philosophic liberation . No other dimension of human thought or existence has the
breadth or depth o r intricacy and multiplicity of implications that characterize
philosophv.
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The second form of servitude suggested by the remarks of Roszak and Whitehead is
that associated with the lack of certain conceptual sensibilities. By the phrase 'conceptual
sensibilities' I mean the various languages or conceptual frameworks appropriate to the
various disciplines, languages which we must internalize if we are going to be sensitive
to or aware of the objects that comprise a particular dimension of reality. For example,
most of us do not possess the conceptual sensibilities of an entomologist; and consequently, we are satisfied to divide the world of insects into crawling insects and flying
insects. That is all we need to know in order to buy the right kind of bug spray. But for the
dedicated entomologist his insect-world is infinitely richer than this crude division
would suggest. The point of these remarks is that to the extent that we lack certain
conceptual sensibilities our lives will be necessarily determined by the objects and events
that comprise the corresponding dimension of reality. If we lack the conceptual sensibilities of an entomologist and are bitten by an African bee, then we will probably die
shortly without being aware of the need to seek medical attention. Likewise, to the extent
that we lack meteorological, political, economic, or philosophic sensibilities we will be
unable to respond intelligently to these dimensions of our world. Instead , our lives in
these respects will be subjected to the workings of necessity, both physical and social
necessities. And in the case of a lack of philosophic sensibilities, our lives will be
subjected to a necessity of the most fundamental and pervasive sort possible.
What then is required of an introductory philosophy course if it is to effect any
significant degree of philosophic liberation? First, it ought to present a variety of
philosophic viewpoints in as sympathetic a way as possible. Such an approach is usually
enough to free an individual from enslavement to the pre-reflective "na tural " philosophy
of his culture or social group. Second, an introductory philosophy course ought to help an
individual begin the process of acquiring as broad and complex a set of philosophic
sensibilities as possible in order that he might begin to respond in a free and intelligent
way to the philosophic dimension of his world. I emphasize the word 'respo nd ' because I
wish to bring out the ultimately practical end of the development of these sensibilities.
They liberate action in that they suggest new ends for action and new means for achieving
these ends, the result being greater control over our environment.
Perhaps nowhere is the practical import of these sensibilities exhibited more clearly
than in the history of the development of science and technology. Unfortunately, as
Dewey so often lamented , our philosophic sensibilities have not kept pace with our
scientific sensibilities. Hence, today we have a twentiety-century science and technology
interpreted and responded to in the light of a seventeenth-century philosophy. If a
philosophy were merely a personal set of beliefs and values toted about by individuals in
their heads , then perhaps we could tolerate this disparity. But a philosophy determines
the ultimate possibilities of social action within a culture. It determines the kinds of social
and political and economic institutions that can be conceived and constructed within a
culture.
If the sinews and muscles of a culture are constituted by its political and economic
organization and its technological capacities, then the central nervous system of that
culture is its philosophy. It determines in a fundamental way the range and refinement of
all the responses of that culture. It is the communications systems of a culture. It
determines in a basic way both the form and the content of what is communicable. As
Dewey writes, communication is uniquely instrumental "as liberating us from the
otherwise overwhelming pressure of events a nd enabling us to live in a world of things
that have meaning." 8 Thus, the liberality of a philosophy, its capacity to create free and
full communication at the deepest levels, is the best index of the liberality of a culture and
its institutions. Likewise, the illiberality of a philosophy will be a good index of the depth
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of serntude within a given culture. In either case, failure on the part of an individual to
acquire the requisite philosophic sensibilities will mean servitude of the profoundest
sort, for he will be able to neither recognize his condition nor to fashion the instruments
needed to remedy it. Thus, the provision of these sensibilities 1s the first liberating
function of philosophy.
The second liberating function of philosophy has to do with giving a student the ability
to recogmze and analyze the functioning of paradigms within his thought and within his
culture. Bv a 'paradigm' I mean a metaphor that structures in a fundamental way our
pattern, of thinking and acting with respect to a particular field of experience or inquiry.
What makes paradigms of special interest to philosophers is that they structure a field of
thought and action in a f1111d,1111t'lllal way. What makes paradigms especially relevant to
this paper is that they usually operate at a pre-reflective level. That is, we often think and
act in accord with them without self-consciously recognizing that we are doing so. For
this reason I think it fair to say that we are enslaved by such paradigms .
One of the more controversial cases of paradigm recogmtion and rejection in recent
vears revolves around a book entitled TIil' ,\111l/1 of Me11/a/ Illness by a psychiatrist , Thomas
Szasz. '' Szasz does not doubt that there are all sorts of people who suffer from delus10ns,
halluc111ahons, and the inability to establish satisfactory interpersonal relationships .
What he does doubt, however, is our ability to respond effectively and intelligently to
these people so long as our inst1tut10nal patterns of response are governed by the medical
paradigm which requires that we respond to these problems in the same general way as
we would to any physical illness. I cannot argue the merits of Szasz's case here. The point
1s that for a long time this paradigm governed a broad range of soCJal responses ,
apparentlv without anyone being criticallv aware of this fact.
Another critical example of the functioning of paradigms may be gleaned from a speech
four vears ago bv Senator "Scoop" Jackson during the Mid-East oil crisis. He spoke then
of oil as "the lifeblood of the nation." If th is is literally true, then the moral implications
are nothing short of astonishing. For we would be warranted on grounds of self-defense
in waging an atomic war against the Arabs to guarantee our oil supply. On the other
hand , if oil is just a very important commodity for an industrialized nation , and if we
could survive as a nation with a reduced oi l supply and a reduced G.N.P., then the moral
grounds for waging war against the Arabs would be non-existent. Again, my point is that
this paradigm has governed, and continues to govern, 1n a pre-reflective way our political
responses. To the extent that this is true, we are enslaved by this paradigm. I take it then
that another of the practical, f1111da111c11/al ways 111 which philosophy can contribute to
human liberation 1s by sensitizing us to the existence and operation of paradigms in our
cu !tu re.
A third source of philosophic servitude is to be found in the philosophic presuppositions that govern our thought and action. Like paradigms, they tend to govern our
thought in a pre-reflective way. Hence, they are not obviously available for critical
scrutiny. Moreover, since these presuppositions are of a pliliosopl11c sort, their influence
tends to be pervasive . A simple example that l use in class to illustrate the enslaving
features of unscrut111ized philosophic presuppoS1t10ns is the question, "Who made the
world?" The very asking of the question presupposes that we accept as true at least three
claims, namely, that the world had a beg11111111g, that the world was 111ade, and that a
personal bc111g was responsible for making the world. All of these claims may well be true.
But the point is that if we have not explicitly recognized these presuppositions we will
unknowmglv be locked into certain mode, of quest10ning thmkmg, and act111g which
mav or mav not prove fruitful. In short, our lives will be necessarily rather than freely
determined in the relevant respects . A third important respect, then, in which
philosophv contributes to human liberation is bv providing us with the critical tool s we
7

need for recognizing and analyzing the operative philosophic presuppositions in our
111 jividual and collective thought and action. Furthermore, this third form of liberation 1s
qot ust a liberation from our old presuppositions, but it is a liberat10n fo, asking new
quL,tions Philosophic presuppositions constitute the horizons of our thoughts. In the
verv act of recogmzing them we move bevond them. We cannot hope to get beyond all
h h horizons, for thev are logicallv among the conditions of rationahtv and freedom. But
W E c.i n hope to pu,h those horizons back as far as possible.
\ f rnrth form of servitude which 1t ,s the task of philosophy to save us from is the
1sol,1tedness of concrete immediacy We are too enamoured by facts, data, tidbits of
111furmation We fear theories and abstractions unless they are severely controlled by
facts But if we examine the history of ideas, what we find is that the great liberators of
hum an thought and action have not been the fact -gatherers primarily but the men of
sp eu .1 lative vision In this regard Wh1 tehead writes. "Human life is driven forward by its
din , pprehension of 11otw11s too genera/ for its existing language. Such ideas cannot be
gra w d singly , one by one in ,solatl0n . They require that mankind advances 111 its
apprehension of the general nature of th111g~. so ,1s to conceive S\/Slcms of ideas elucidating
e ,er , ther ' '" In ,1 similar vein Dewey wntes:
/\s long as we worship soence ,rnd are afraid of philosophy we shall have no great
ience ; we shall have a lagging and halting continuation of what is thought and
11d elsewhere. As far as any plea is impliot in what has been said, it is, then, a
p lea for the casting off of that intellect1.1al timidity which hampers the wings of
11naginat1on , a plea for speculative audacity , for more faith in ideas , sloughing off a
cowardly re liance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name
)f facts. ''
'
s

l woof the liberatmg characteristics of philosophv are its generality and ,ts comprehensiv e systematicity The generality of philosophy is what saves us from being trapped
wi•hin the circle of beliefs that are tribal , sectarian and provincial. It keeps alive our
idea ls by suggesting that the present embodiment of our ideals need not be their final
e'T! bodiment. This pomt is well documented bv Whitehead in hisA,fo,,11111,es of Jde,1, with
re sp ect to the ideal of freedom. He shows how this ideal first emerged among the Greeks
at th e time of Plato, received concrete but inadequate embodiment in the feeble democratic in stitutions of the Greeks, and was judged as an appropriate ideal of life for only some
few men. The h,storv of the West has been the history of the growth of this ideal in the
fo rm of more and more adequate embodiment 111 our political, social , and economic
mst itutions. But the point ,s that even now the ideal of freedom serves to liberate us by its
su ggestion of the madequacy of its present inst,tuhonal embodiments. We realize that
m erely givmg women the vote did not adequately effect their liberation, nor did merely
repe aling segregation laws adequate Iv effect the liberation of blacks. But we can have this
fl'?.li za tion onlv because we operate with an ,deal of freedom that is abstract enough that
,t L,111 never be perfectly embodied vV1thout such ideals we would be enslaved to the
ct,1, us quo.
f he other point suggested by Whitehead and Dewey is that liberation ,s a function of
the comprehensive systematicity of our thinkmg In the passage from Whitehead quoted
a t the beg111ning of this paper he said that freedom was to be found wherever ideas are
effrct ive But as he observes later, ideas have to be coordinated in order to be effective
The task of philosophy is to provide us w,th the most encompassing forms of coordination possible for our ideas Agam , wherever we f111d a revolution occurring m thought , a
liber 1tion from old ways of thinking , we never find th,1t a smgle fact brought about that
re, i..i t rn Ra th er it was a massive coordination of ideas.
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In trying to convince my students of the importance of having a self-conscious
philoso phi c perspective of their own , I often play for them the old Beatles' song Nowhere
.\!1111 . The relevant lyrics are:
Doesn 't have a point of view,
knows not where he's going to ,
isn ' t he a bit like you and me7
Nowhere Man please listen ,
you don ' t know what you're missing,
Nowhere Man , the world is at your command. 12
The Nowhere Man is very much like a piece of desert tumbleweed. He does not seem to be
confined at all. He seems to possess absolute freedom. He has the world at his command.
But this is meant to be ironic. The Nowhere Man , far from being absolutely free, is
absoluteJy enslaved by whatever forces, fads , or fashions are creating a stir in his
environment. And the same situation obtains for an individual who has not thought out
his own philosophic viewpoint. He will be forced to move with whatever moral and social
pressures happen to be dominating his environment. But to the extent that an individual
does have a reflective philosophic point of view , and not just an uncoordinated assortment of beliefs , he can resist these environmental pressures and choose for himself the
direction in which he wi shes to move . In short, philosophy, by virtue of its comprehens ive systemat,city , is a fundamental source of human liberation.
Ill.

In this concluding section l wish to develop a point I made in my introductory remarks.
lt is that while philosophy possesses a liberating potentiality, whether or not that
potentiality is brought to actualization in the classroom is as much a function of factors
intrinsic to philosophy as it is a function of how philosophy is presented. Philosophy
mu t be presented in a liberating way if it is to be an effective source of liberatio.
Paolo Freire in his book The Pedagogy of the Oppressed distinguishes between two
meth ods of education which he refers to as the " banking" and "problem-posing"
methods of education. The banking method identifies education with information dissemination. Students are treated essentially as things to be stocked with information.
Students are expected to be passive , manageable , adaptable beings. As Freire observes:
" The more completely they [students] accept the passive role imposed on them , the more
they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality
deposited in them. " " For Freire this is educational oppression, for it involves turning
men into automatons by negating their ontological vocation to be more fully human, to
develop themselves as free beings. By way of contrast , the problem-posing method of
education rests on the assumption that "knowledge emerges only through invention and
re-invention , through the restless, impatient, continuing , hopeful inquiry men pursue in
th e world , with the world , and with each other. " 14 The problem-posing method of
educatwn insists that cognition be an act of inquiry rather than a transferral of information ; for that is more consistent with the fact that man is an unfinished, incomplete being
living in an incomplete world, that man is a historical being, a creative being, a free
being , a being always capable of transcending himself.
By wa y of illustrating the problem-posing method of education l would like to describe
briefly th e project that students in my introductory philosophy courses presently work
on . The proiect involves the construction of a " utopian society," by which I mean, not
so me pie-in-the-sky utterly unrealistic society , but a society that is better in specifiable
9

respects than our present society. The project itself is divided into fifteen practical
problem areas, e.g., problems related to human sexuality, abortion and euthanasia as
means of population control, biological and psyschological engineering, capital punishment, the distribution of wealth, the function of government, the function of laws,
natural rights, civil disobedience, the nature of education, and so on. The class is divided
into groups of seven, each of which is responsible for constructing its own utopia. Each
group as a group writes a ten-page paper outlming their utopia and defining and
justifying the ultimate goals and values of that society . Each member of the group must in
addition write two five-page papers dealing with two of the remaining fourteen problem
areas in the project. All problem areas are covered by each group. Moreover, these
problems are discussed in the light of the ultimate goals and values that each group has
committed itself to, so that what should emerge is a comprehensive and consistent vision
of that society. At the end of the semester each group presents and defends its group
paper before the rest of the class.
What I take to be the specifically liberating features of this project are as follows. (1) It
encourages comprehensive, systematic thinking, for a variety of problems have to be
dealt with in the light of the ultimate goals and values of a given society. (2) It requires
students to make their own inquiries. No "right" answers are imposed on them .
Moreover, this inquiry is carried on as a community, thus emphasizing that knowledge
and liberation are primarily social affairs. (3) It encourages the development of critical
thinking since the student must recognize the deficiencies of their own society before
they can construct a better society. (4) The presentations at the end of the semester and the
discussion during the semester within each group make evident the variety of viable
philosophic options available. (5) This project enables students to see the ultimately
practical thrust of philosophy . They recognize that philosophy makes a difference in the
sort of social institutions we have , whether or not we may be aware of it. (6) Through the
recognition of the philosophic dimension of our present social institutions students
begin to develop the philosophic sensibilities that I mentioned earlier as a necessary
component of philosophic liberation. Lastly, (7) students begin to recognize that they
have been in a state of servitude, a very fundamental form of servitude, a very subtle but
nevertheless real form of servitude. Arid they begin to realize that philosophy in particular, and the liberal arts in general, have a very practical function in human life, namely ,
that of human liberation.
NOTES
1
Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press , 1967, orig.
1932), p. 65.
2 The reader will find the work of Marshall McLuhan quite enlightening on the general
point of this remark. See especially his Understanding Media: The E, te11sia11~ of .".Ian (New
York: New American Library, 1964).
3 Dewey, John. Democracy a11d Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966 , orig.1916),
p. 123.
4
Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimens1onal Ma11 (Boston: Beacon Press, paperback, 1966), p
7,
5 Dewey thinks Jefferson was mistaken in believing that political freedom could be
maintained without being based on a broader cultural freedom. See John Dewey , Frerdom
and Culture (New York: Capricorn books, 1963 , orig. 1939), p. 6.
6 Whitehead, p. 12.
7 Roszak, Theodore. The Making of a Counter C11lt11re (New York: Doubleday Anchor,
1969), p. 8 ,
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